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LIKE A HOLE IN THE HEAD
LIEF H. CARTER*
The Devil is the absence of doubt.  He’s what pushes people into sui-
cide bombing, into setting up extermination camps.  Doubt may give
your dinner a funny taste, but it’s faith that goes out and kills.1
Pride goes before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall.2
As its title suggests, this Essay will argue that any attempt to find a
constructive place for religion “in”—as opposed to explicitly “distinct
from”—constitutional democracies should be counted as a fool’s er-
rand.  Unless, for the sake of political correctness, we seriously distort
the definitions of “religion” and “constitutional democracy,” this ef-
fort at reconciliation cannot meet basic tests of internal coherence,
evidentiary credibility, and normative persuasiveness.  Despite the un-
derstandable urge to do so, the challenge of reconciling religion and
constitutional democracy faces several fatal obstacles.
Considered as ideal types, the properties underlying the terms
“religion” (a concern, which depends on faith instead of a reason,
with things unknowable in the universe) and “constitutional democ-
racy” (a form of government that conforms to legal commands and
pursues policy choices derived from the consent of the governed) are
no more commensurate than are the properties of, say, “broccoli” and
“manual transmissions.”3  We detect and measure their presence in
distinctly different ways.
The internal characteristics of concrete religious practices contra-
dict those of constitutional democracies, and these internal contradic-
tions parallel those between “science” and “religion.”  Science
depends on open-minded skepticism, rigorous methods of empirical
validation, and an eagerness to find new knowledge that will displace
Copyright  2009 by Lief H. Carter.
* LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1965, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1972,
Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Colorado College.
1. JOHN UPDIKE, ROGER’S VERSION 85 (Ballantine Books 1987) (1986) (words spoken
by Roger Lambert, a fictional theology professor).
2. Proverbs 16:18 (A Reader’s Guide to the Holy Bible—Revised Standard Edition).
3. Dictionary definitions of “religion” illustrate the contradiction. See, e.g., MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 988 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “religion” as “the service
and worship of God or the supernatural” or “commitment or devotion to religious faith or
observance”).
39
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 2 25-NOV-09 9:03
40 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 69:39
the old.4  Similarly, democratic systems necessarily entail crude empir-
ical tests of whether policies succeed or fail—such as public opinion
polls in electoral politics and various rationality tests in due process
and equal protection jurisprudence—and methods by which to
change them.  Religion, on the other hand, necessarily entails faith in
received doctrine and acceptance of mystery that “passes all under-
standing.”5  When “true believers” encounter political rejection of
their positions—for example, in the teaching of evolution in public
schools or the permissibility of adoption by same-gender couples—
they react dogmatically.6  When a religious order like the modern
Episcopal Church in the United States moves to change its rules and
policies, such as those regarding the place and relevance of gender
and sexual orientation in its system, true believers have rebelled and
then exited.7
Most fatal of all, the external consequences of religious behaviors
directly undercut those of constitutional democracies, and vice versa.
Both as a pretext for leaders and as a motivation for their followers,
religion’s insistence on the collective truthfulness and righteousness
of a single way of life has routinely provoked and facilitated human
brutality and warfare.8  In clear contrast, constitutional democracy,
which may be said to have evolved in reaction to Europe’s religious
wars, strives to keep the peace.  Such democracy replaces substantive
truthfulness and righteousness with procedural correctness—the rule
of law—and an explicit encouragement of substantive compromise.
Compromise and fluidity in politics offset the violent tendencies of
religious commitment and certainty.  Indeed, political compromise
cannot happen until the contending parties agree about what they are
compromising.  In short, constitutional democracy needs religion, as
the common phrase goes, “like a hole in the head.”
4. See PHILIP KITCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 33, 65 (1982)
(explaining that science advances claims about concepts that may be unobservable and
that scientists correlate various methods of testing).
5. Philippians 4:7 (A Reader’s Guide to the Holy Bible—Revised Standard Edition).
6. See, e.g., Ethan Cole, Christian Doctor Loses Position over Gay Adoption View, CHRISTIAN
POST, July 21, 2009, http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090721/christian-doctor-
loses-position-over-gay-adoption-view/index.html (reporting that a physician on an adop-
tion panel refused to vote on adoption cases for same-sex couples because “‘[a]s a Chris-
tian,’” she deemed homosexuality an inappropriate lifestyle).
7. See Deborah Caldwell, Where Anglicans Fear to Tread: Will a Schism Destroy the Episcopal
Church?, SLATE, Jan. 14, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2093811 (describing conservative
protests within the Episcopal Church over the election of an openly homosexual bishop).
8. See, e.g., BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., MORAL PURITY AND PERSECUTION IN HISTORY ix
(2000) (noting the “bloody struggles” accompanying the establishment and spread of
monotheism).
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I. DEFINING TERMS
Like all arguments, this Essay depends on definitional choices.
After all, one need not define religion as a sectarian commitment to
received doctrine.  Neither must one categorize religion as an ortho-
dox observance of divinely inspired, as opposed to earthly inspired,
law.  Religion can refer to personal and individualized understandings
about the meaning of life, perhaps as a means of affirming the com-
mitment to living well in the face of one’s certain death.  Thus, “relig-
ion” presumably becomes a nearly universal feature of human
cognition, a personal frame that maintains illusions of certainty in the
face of the evident chaos in the universe.9  Moreover, because humans
are not naturally equipped to philosophize on such matters in isola-
tion, institutions—including religious ones—that help individuals
function with equanimity in the face of chaos presumably do good, or
at least do no harm.  Constitutional democracies thus properly “place”
religion so conceived with other categories—for example, the security
of a home, protection against ex post facto laws, and other private
things that the government must “keep its hands off.”  On the other
hand, when religion demands collective political action based on the
commitment to one belief system, there is no significant observable
difference between sectarian commitments to “true gods” and secular
commitments to, for example, the “true principles” of “freedom” that
served to justify the Bush/Cheney invasion of Iraq.10
Even the most clever feats of definitional craftiness will likely
leave us concluding that phrases like “constitutional theocracy” are
inherently oxymoronic.  Of course, some political systems claim to be
guided only by the “word of God” revealed through the Koran or the
Holy Bible, so that such texts become constitutions.11  But no known
9. This definition of religion, however, necessarily includes conventionally amoral be-
liefs such as, “I only go around once in life, so I am going to take everything I can get as I
go.”
10. In recent times, these sectarian and secular commitments have crossed. See Inter-
view with Osama bin Laden, FRONTLINE, May 1998, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html.  In June 2003, President George W. Bush
told Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen that “God told me to strike at al-Qaida and I
struck them; then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did; and now I am deter-
mined to solve the problem in the Middle East.”  Sidney Blumenthal, Bush and Blair—The
Betrayal, GUARDIAN, Nov. 14, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/nov/14/
iraq.iraq; see also Richard Rorty, Universality and Truth, in RORTY AND HIS CRITICS 1, 21–22
(Robert B. Brandom ed., 2000) (finding that religious fundamentalists, as well as propo-
nents of secular liberalism, exhibit intolerance).
11. See Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle East-
ern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1823 (2004) (discussing the 1980 amendment to the Egyp-
tian Constitution, which transformed Egypt into an Islamic constitutional theocracy).
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method of interpretation can apply such abstract and often internally
contradictory words to resolve concrete and unique cases without re-
placing the word of God or the words of scripture by the words of
popes, ayatollahs, and other interpreters.12  If the universe and the
human mind were such that humans could objectively demonstrate
that their interpretations were singularly and universally correct, such
a theocracy might meet a standard of constitutionality.
But mind and universe work in the opposite direction toward infi-
nite numbers of plausibly correct answers, just as mathematical princi-
ples such as Cantor’s theorem suggest.13  In other words, the anti-
essentialist quality of reality means that interpretations necessarily
flow either from the will of rulers or from justifications that must com-
port with popular, and therefore shifting, standards of justificatory
performances.  Interpretations based upon the autocratic principle
“because I, your ruler, say so” and those based upon the liberal princi-
ple “because this is what the law does and does not permit” cannot
credibly count as theocratic rule in the name of God.
If the purpose of government is to minimize the conditions in
which humans brutalize other humans via mass murder and other
forms of indiscriminate aggression, then religion should have no
place “in,” as opposed to “distinct from,” constitutional democracies.
As broccoli would presumably gum up a transmission, religion clogs
the political works of constitutional democracies.  Thus, the First
Amendment, regardless of the specific understandings of its Establish-
ment Clause at the time of its ratification, rightly puts robust separa-
tion of church and state at the very beginning of our Bill of Rights.
II. ELABORATION
As set forth here, this Essay’s argument depends on accepting the
empirical claim that religion as a particular way of knowing and acting
is inherently prone to violence.  It also depends on the normative
claim that the primary objective of political systems ought to be that of
minimizing, at the very least, wanton human brutality against other
humans.  The anti-essentialist nature of reality prevents anyone from
12. As Bishop Benjamin Hoadly of Bangor observed in 1717, “Whoever hath an abso-
lute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to
all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.” JOHN CHIP-
MAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 102 & n.2 (1921) (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. W.V. QUINE, QUIDDITIES: AN INTERMITTENTLY PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 96 (1987)
(describing Cantor’s theory as the principle that classes of objects outnumber the individ-
ual objects in the set being classified).
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demonstrating that such normative claims are objectively and univer-
sally correct.  Thus, I confine myself to elaborating my empirical claim
and leave it to readers to initiate objections to my normative claim and
the anti-essentialist epistemology on which it rests.  But if philoso-
phers like Rorty and Quine, cited above,14 express the most accurate
understandings of reality, then all claims to have reached universal
and objective certainties are philosophically untenable.
A group that believes another entity is insulting its belief system
may respond in a detrimental fashion.  For example, in November
2007, a British schoolteacher in Sudan was jailed for “insulting Islam’s
Prophet” after she permitted students to name a teddy bear “Muham-
mad.”15  In January 2009, parents who believed that faith alone would
cure their ill daughter stood trial for reckless endangerment after the
child died from failure to receive medical treatment.16  At the macro
level, these stories illustrate a historical pattern of human atrocities
that have resulted from a group’s response to a perceived affront to its
principles—for example, the Crusades, the genocides of North Ameri-
can Indians, and the Khmer Rouge genocide.17
III. OBJECTIONS
This Essay’s argument thus boils down to the claim that civilizing
the human species requires us to deliberately move away from truth-
based habits of thinking, be they sectarian or secular, and toward
open and skeptical ways of thinking.  At least three objections come
readily to mind.  First, polities, like individuals, may need a common
“reality framework” that their members believe to be normatively true
and beyond question in order to survive external threats.  Second, po-
litical and social systems must inculcate some common moral order in
their members before internal cooperation—civilization rather than
the war of all against all—is possible.  For example, the late Reverend
Richard John Neuhaus observed that democracies depend on sharing
14. See supra notes 10, 13. R
15. ‘Muhammad’ Teddy Teacher Arrested, BBC NEWS, Nov. 26, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7112929.stm (noting that fellow teachers “feared for [the ar-
rested teacher’s] safety” after men gathered outside the police station where she was held).
16. Dirk Johnson, Trials for Parents Who Chose Faith over Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2009, at A23.
17. For a more extensive but nonexclusive list of similar atrocities emerging from this
“righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle,” see Lief H. Carter, Law and Politics as Play, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1333, 1350 n.76 (2008).
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specifically Christian morality (or something very much like it).18  But
of course Islamists, Leninist-Stalinists, Marxists, and Nazis have made
comparable claims for their faiths.  The better objection, then, holds
that all nations must have some civil-religion equivalent before internal
cooperation can happen.  Third, human cognition in both its public
and private arenas is inherently religious and not scientific.  John Up-
dike explained the point this way on National Public Radio:
Cosmically, I seem to be of two minds.  The power of materi-
alist science to explain everything from the behavior of the
galaxies to that of molecules, atoms and their sub-micro-
scopic components seems to be inarguable and the principal
glory of the modern mind.  On the other hand, the reality of
subjective sensations, desires and may we even say illusions,
composes the basic substance of our existence, and religion
alone, in its many forms, attempts to address, organize, and
placate these.  I believe, then, that religious faith will con-
tinue to be an essential part of being human, as it has been
for me.19
The first two objections are, at least as I have worded them, with-
out merit.  Tribes presumably need some common markers to define
“who is with us and who is against us,” but these identifiers need only
be visible markers such as flags, uniforms, logos, hair and body-paint
styles, and so on.20  People easily identify themselves as Buckeyes or
British soldiers or citizens of France or Texans without resorting to
theologies or abstract moral frameworks for doing so.
Furthermore, the factors that promote interpersonal cooperation
within groups do not seem necessarily rooted in any kind of moral
norm that obligates one to cooperate.  The utilitarian benefits from
cooperation—the obvious efficiency of transactions, greater predict-
ability of the future, and reduced stress levels that follow from trust—
are well documented.  Atheists who have never heard of the Kantian
imperative cooperate just as well as theists do.  Note the generosity
and honesty of Warren Buffett, who is agnostic.21
18. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 20 (1984) (explaining his belief that Christians are responsible for “ad-
vanc[ing] a social vision”).
19. John Updike, All Things Considered: Updike’s ‘This I Believe’ Essay (National Public
Radio broadcast Jan. 27, 2009) (transcript on file with the Maryland Law Review).
20. See, e.g., DESMOND MORRIS, THE SOCCER TRIBE 256 (1981) (describing how soccer
fans are often found “waving . . . a forest of coloured flags”).
21. John Lofton, Warren Buffet “Agnostic,” Bill Gates Rejects Sermon on the Mount, Not
“Huge Believer” in “Specific Elements” of Christianity, AM. VIEW, July 3, 2006, http://
www.theamericanview.com/index.php?id=649 (quoting an e-mail from Warren Buffet’s as-
sistant regarding his religious beliefs: “Mr. Buffett is agnostic.”).  Warren Buffett is not the
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR104.txt unknown Seq: 7 25-NOV-09 9:03
2009] LIKE A HOLE IN THE HEAD 45
The third objection, however, does accurately describe human
cognition.  The human brain does not operate as a binary digital
processor.22  Professor Bruce Hood suggests that human beings enter-
tain irrational beliefs because the human brain is wired for supernatu-
ral modes of reasoning.23  Thus, the critical question for modern
political theory becomes the following: If liberalism’s assumptions
about man’s capacity for reason fail empirically while the thrust of
both research and daily experience reaffirm the persistence of de-
structive and irrational political forms, how can humans ever achieve
liberalism’s pacific goals?
As illustrated in my previous work, Law and Politics as Play,24 an
argument about play may rescue liberalism.  People across cultures
understand that the qualities of good sports and games stem not from
an abstract moral theory, but from characteristics such as equal re-
sources for players and obedience to the judgment of umpires.25
These characteristics short circuit the cycle of righteousness, humilia-
tion, and brutality.26  This happens in no small part because competi-
tive sports remove the stigma of losing.27  Indeed, the very process of
trying to win undercuts a mentality of moral righteousness.28  No one,
if they seek to win, selects a pitch or chooses a play because the choice
is the righteous one.
For roughly two centuries, Anglo-American common law and
western democratic political forms have visibly moved in the direction
of replicating the characteristics of good games.29  In law, key develop-
ments like Gideon v. Wainwright30 and footnote four of United States v.
only billionaire philanthropist who is a non-believer. See Peter Singer, What Should a Billion-
aire Give—and What Should You?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 6 (Magazine) (noting that
“three of the four greatest American Philanthropists”—Buffett, Bill Gates, and Andrew
Carnegie—are or were atheists or agnostics).
22. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 5 (2001) (ex-
plaining that cognition involves “imaginative, associative, and analogical” processes rather
than computational operations).
23. James Randerson, Humans ‘Hardwired for Religion,’ GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 2006, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/sep/04/religion.uk (describing an experi-
ment in which subjects withdrew their willingness to don a cardigan after Professor Hood
falsely informed them that a notorious murderer had previously owned the sweater).
24. Carter, supra note 17. R
25. Id. at 1363–64.
26. Id. at 1361.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1362 (“Winning teams never believe that their ‘moral purity’ entitles them
to win.  Wise competitors do not talk of their side’s righteousness.”).
29. See id. at 1368–76 (applying the characteristics of competitive games to law and
politics).
30. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding that an indigent criminal defendant’s right to
counsel is “fundamental and essential to fair trials” in the United States).
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Carolene Products Co.31 can be read simply as steps toward equalizing
the chances that each side can win the adversarial legal contest.32  The
Bush administration was roundly criticized for its secrecy and for its
extra-legal activity.33  The Obama administration openly and repeat-
edly praises the importance of governmental transparency and the
rule of law.34  Thus, in a nutshell, I argue that constitutional democ-
racy itself aspires to be nothing more than a good game.
IV. AFTERTHOUGHT: FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL TESTS
By taking the anti-essentialist quality of reality as a given, I cannot
in good faith argue for any single and demonstrably correct “proper
interpretation” of the United States Constitution’s Religion Clauses.  I
am deeply skeptical that any abstract rule or legal doctrine can wisely
resolve the nearly infinite context-specific varieties of fact situations
that can arise in law and life.  I believe that the genius of common law
lies in its ability to accommodate and thrive in such realities without a
foundation.  Instead, in the spirit of the good competitive play of
ideas, I suggest the following First Amendment guidelines and en-
courage readers to counter them.
First Amendment jurisprudence should be anchored in the famil-
iar legal tool of the placement of the burdens of proof and persuasion
on one side or the other.  Using something like a probing rational
basis test that Justice Stevens advocated when he concurred in Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,35 courts should actively reject any policy
choice when its advocates only present religious/moral, and therefore
immeasurable, arguments to support it.  Establishment jurisprudence
should require proponents of public policies to carry the burden of
showing that policies can or plausibly will deliver measurable tangible
benefits for people.  Policies whose defense rests only on intangible
31. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that courts should apply a heightened
standard of scrutiny when confronting “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”).
32. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 17, at 1369–70 (detailing the elements of competitive R
game theory found in Carolene Products footnote four).
33. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 343, 360 (2008) (“Many of the security measures taken by the Bush Administration
following September 11 were done under the cloak of secrecy.”).
34. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stohlberg, On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (quoting President Obama at a swearing-in ceremony for gov-
ernment officials on the first day of his term as President: “For a long time now there’s
been too much secrecy in this city . . . . Transparency and rule of law will be the touch-
stones of this presidency.”).
35. See 473 U.S. 432, 451–52 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing the explana-
tion of “well-defined” tiers of scrutiny because the rational basis test sufficiently includes
“elements of legitimacy and neutrality”).
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religious and moral beliefs should fail.  Under such a test, litigation
over same-gender adoption policies would focus on the results of
adoption outcome studies.  As research illustrates, same-gender two-
parent adoptions produce outcomes close to those produced by heter-
osexual parent couples.36  With respect to policies that interfere with
voluntary religious and moral practices, whether sectarian or not,
courts should seriously consider the requirement that proponents of
such policies must demonstrate evidence that it is narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest.  This test, when applied to the
Amish, would reaffirm their freedom to end their children’s formal
education after the eighth grade.37  Policies opposing the civil unions
of same-sex couples, just as policies that require churches to sanctify
such marriages, would most likely fail these tests.  But all such matters,
including whether a state that legally applies the term “marriage” to
same-sex unions undercuts the quality of marriage for believers,
should be litigated not on the basis of what professors write, but on
good adversarial contests about the facts.
36. See, e.g., Ellen C. Perrin, Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family
Health, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIAT-
RICS 341, 343 (2002) (concluding that “there is no systematic difference between gay and
nongay parents in emotional health, parenting skills, and attitudes toward parenting”).
37. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 234–36 (1972) (overturning a state law
requiring Amish children to attend high school until age sixteen when the proffered state
interest was not an “interest of the highest order” such that it could “overbalance [a] legiti-
mate claim[ ] to the free exercise of religion”).
